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EARLY SUGGESTIONS OF THE MODERN
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION.
In a former number of this Journal, the present writer called
attention to the gradual development of the Supreme Court's
clearly acknowledged power to declare void an act of Congress
inconsistent with the Constitution. Not only, however, can this
judicial function claim a remote origin, but the scheme itself of a
written constitution is far from being a modern invention and
strikes its roots far into the past, being illustrated, in fact, at more
than one period of distinct importance to the history of constitu-
tional law. Nor shall the failure of these ancient attempts to es-
tablish a basis of government which has proved so successful in
modern times, render the constitutional plans themselves less
worthy of attention on the part of all interested in institutional
origints.
The publication, in i89i, of the recovered constitution of
Athens .-'AO7ip'zcov zrolzrstoa- brought to light the details of
the remarkable machinery by which it was sought to p!ace the
government devised by the revolutionists of the spring of B.C.
411 under the limitations of a written plan whose essential prin-
ciples, from a constitutional standpoint, are those of the limited
constitution of to-day. For this apparently radical departure in
public administration the Athenian mind had, nevertheless, been
well and long prepared, despite the undoubted truth that the city-
state possessed neither a jurisprudence in any proper acceptation
of that term, nor yet an authoritatively written constitution, the sole
evidence of law fundamental, to which public appeal could be
made, being the Atoves or xv'pfiets, whose graven terms hanging
in the prytaneion were supposed to be familiar to every citizen
and whose provisions were firmly secured against sudden change
through a legislative system of law-committees, together with an
ultimate right of appeal to the sovereign people itself in its iXzotfa
by means of the celebrated action mrvpatlopct" ypat r'. The
Athenian law (ro'lAog), however, was in effect a very different
affair from the enactment which we term statute. From a period,
indeed, long antedating authentic history, a board of magistrates
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had been charged with the special duty of publicly recording im-
portant judicial utterances (rd 0larpzat) to the end that the
principles they announced might, in the absence of a written code,
be preserved for enforcement against transgressors.1 To these
9 e'vJza succeeded the more formal v ,go' or 0 ear#6 of Drako
and Solon; the Nomos, however, was intended to accomplish much
more than the announcement merely of substantive law, and, be-
yond question, tended to take on a form closely approximating
a distinct constitutional plan ;2 for these laws were, we are told,
arranged in groups correspondent with the subjects which they
were designed to regulate. Accordingly the Archonship and other
departments of State had its special group of Nomoi constituting
its organic regulation; and the collection of such groups, was an-
nually laid before the people met in sovereign assembly at the be-
ginning of each Attic year (July-August) in order that public
opinion might be taken touching the desirability of any fundamen-
tal change.8
For a pure democracy such a system presented-ample safe-
guards, but when in B. C. 411 a crisis had evidently been reached
rendering some radical alteration in government necessary, Athens
hesitated to place itself in the hands of the few-oz dt'yoz-with-
out the interposition of firmer barriers than the ancient
2rozrd-'a and vo/toz could offer. Now it was that the need of
specifically-defined limitation became apparent; a feeling of ap-
prehension not unlike, doubtless, that which was so plainly in evi-
dence at the formation of our own Articles of Confederation and
Constitution, led to the greatest care in framing a charter of
government. A preliminary board of thirty commissioners laid down
x. These magistrates were the Thesmothetee (Coast. Athens, 3.4). With
the thesmia we may compare the Homeric themistes.
2. This most interesting subject is elaborately treated by Busolt (Grie-
chische Geschichte, 2.41 seq.) Denn da Solon nicht bloss Gesetze gab, die
das materielle Rechtbetrafen, sondern auch Anordnungen traf, die in die Ver-
fassung eingriffen, so konnte er letztere nicht bloss miIndlich zur Nachachtung
mitteilen, sondern musste sie auch schriftlich feststellen. Freilich hater keine
systematische Verfassungsurkunde entworfen und die staatlichen Einrichtun-
gen, die er vorfand und unverlindert liess, in seinen Gesetzen als bestehend
vorausgesetzt, aber da er die Gesetze nach den einzelnen Behorden, die sie zu
handhaben hatten, zusammenstellte, so wird er gewiss in dem Nomos einer
Beh rde auch. fber die Art ihrer Zusammensetzung gehandelt haben, sofern
er sic ne geschaffen oder reorganisiert hatte.
3. The grouping is indicated in the document inserted at § 20 of Demos-
thenes' speech against Timocrates as the legislative machinery by commit-
tees (nomothetae) is detailed at § 33.
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certain basic principles in the nature of bill of rights plainly writ-
ten out;4 these being approved, a special committee of one hundred
proceeded to draw up a formal plan of government, precisely de-
fining powers and duties to be entrusted to the proposed oligarchy,
the expression employed in the account which has come down to
us being very significant, the commissioners being "they who were to
write down the government" Tot3f ,&Ytyp -oYira'er?'rY 7 ro2zr'rda, 5
the terms of the written charter being referred to in a subsequent
paragraph as Tc' yrypqpuJdifa6 this constitution being formally re-
ported (d,? hyuav), was adopted, while a provisional plan, and
that, indeed, under which the Four Hundred were enabled to
grasp practically irresponsible power, was expected to pave the
way for an ultimate transition to government by council without
an assembly and acting only under the limitation of the proposed
charter. The entire incident, including the subsequent return to
democracy, the constitotion of the fathers ('r7iv 7r(ptov 7ro.trltarv)
illustrates with the utmost clearness the distinction at which Greek
public thought had manifestly arrived in the employment of the
term "constitution" (7roA2zr,&') in the abstract and in the concrete;
this is, in fact, the same, distinction with which we are so familiar
to-day when we apply the term "constitution" to such a form of
government as that of Great Britain on the one hand, and our
own upon the other. It is nothing less than the distinction between the
immediate presence, as in England, of sovereignty in legislation
and administration, and government through a representation, as
in the United States, acting under written limitations-in other
words, the modem written constitution.
A similar constitutional spirit manifests itself in the carefully
drawn declaration, passed upon the formation of the general de-
fensive alliance of 378-377 B. C. and preserved through the sure
medium, of an inscription. A notable feature of this marble is
the denouncement of high treason upon the magistrate or private
citizen who attempts any derogation from its provisions; all such
action, in the language of to-day, is, in other words, made "null
and void."'7  Such a prohibition was not, however, a novelty in
Greek public law; it occurs in the charter of Brea,s B. C. 444-44o,
4, ""They ordered the (new) government according to this plan," says the
author, of the'AO. 0oA. (29.5). 777), io .relo a 6rdraa r6vi6s rp67ror KTr.5. "AO. itoXt. 30. 1.
6. 'AO. -xoL. 31.3.
7. Hicks, Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1882), p. x38,
seq. No. 81.
8. Hicks, p. 37, No. 29.
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and in the decree passed by the Opuntian Lockrians at the colon-
zation of Naupaktos9 (inc. 403 B. C.) ; the last named regulation
specially providing for a judicial determination, touching any
claimed infringement of the constitution, thus exhibiting a perfect
analogue of our own system.
Under widely differing political conditions, but with essentially
similar constitutional aims, it was sought on two notable occasions
in English history, to place the kingdom under the limitation of
a definite scheme of written fundamental law. The first of these
occasions arose through the struggle to limit the Crown in- a firmer
manner than experience had shown could be accomplished through
the numerous so-called "charters," whose promises were as easily
broken as made; and the magnates, who in 1258 and 1264, devised
the constitutional plans, known as the Provisions of Oxford and the
Forma regiminis domini regis et regni,10 displayed not only a keen
apprehension of the political necessities of the thirteenth century,
but a thorough grasp as well of the conception of limited govern-
ment. Nor should it for a moment be supposed that the consti-
tutional aims which here found such remarkable expression were
the result of any sudden illumination; they were, in fact, but the
legitimate product of a slowly developing consciousness of the in-
nate and indefeasible supremacy of law. Law it is, which to the
more deeply thinking minds of that age, demands homage as the
true sovereign through whose prescriptions the king governs:
Legem quoque dicimus regis dignitatem
Regere, nam credimus esse legem lucem,
Istayn legem stabilem nullus rex mutabit,
Sed se variabilem Per istam firmabit;
sings the author of the celebrated song of Lewes;" his poem, we
may note, is precisely co-temporaneous with the latter of our two
constitutional documents whose brief existence was foreclosed
with the fall at Evesham, of Simon de Montfort, August 4, 1265.
Four centuries later, in the days of the coming commonwealth,
the public mind had again turned to the idea of law, as its refuge
against royal oppression, and, as in the time of the Barons, an
elaborate plan, the "Heads of the Proposals,"1 2 was expected to
9. Hicks, p. 117, No. 63.
xo. Stubbs, Select Charters (3rd ed.) p. 387. 413.
xi. The Song of Lewes, edited by C. L. Kingsford, lines 848-849 and 867-
868 (Oxford, Clar. Press, 1890).
12. August x, 1647. The Agreement of the People "was originallydrawn
up in October, 1647," though not finally approved until two weeks prior to the
death of the king; the Instrument of Government came later, December 16,
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hold in check entrenched despotism. When, shortly afterwards,
with the abolition of royalty, the Parliament, the people's "Repre-
sentative," threatened an advent of tryanny under another form,
the agreement of the people and the instrument of the government
were looked to as fundamentals, whose authority should underlie
legislators: "But some things are Fundamentals," said Cromwell
in the Painted Chamber, at Westminster, September 12, 1654,
"about which I shall deal plainly with you; these may not be parted
with; but will, I trust, be delivered over to posterity... The govern-
ment by a single person and a parliament is a fundamental, it is
the esse, it is constitutire . . . As the instrument doth express
it, you may make any laws; and if I give not my consent, within
twenty days, to the passing of your laws, they are ipso facto laws
whether I consent or no; if not contrary to the 'Franie of Govern-
ment.'
January 22, 1655, Cromwell reminds members of the House that
the people expected it to do things "in pursuance of the Instrument
of Government... this Government called you hither," said he, "the
constitution thereof being limited so ... it has been already submitted
to the judicious, true and honest people of this nation . . . and what
their judgment is, is visible, by submission to it; by acting upon
it; by restraining their trustees from meddling with it. And it
neither asks nor needs any better ratification .... I will say this
to you for myself . .. that I would not have been averse to any
alteration of the good of which I might have been convinced
although I could not have agreed to the taking it off the founda-
tion on which it stands; namely, the acceptance and consent of the
People." It needs, truly, but little effort of the imagination to
suppose that we are here listening to an exhortation addressed to
the Congress of the United States, reminding that body that its
authority is as limited as that of an English legislature was in-
tended to be, under the Instrument whose terms expressly provided,
"that all laws, statutes and ordinances, and clauses in any law,
x653-Gardiner, Const. Documents of the Puritan Revolution (p. 232-270-314),
who, however, fails to appraise these documents at their full value in a consti-
tutional sense. "The army," says the learned editor in his introduction,
,1could take care that a man like Charles I should not rule England, but the
Agreement of the People, the Instrument of Government and the Humble
Petition and Advice were but academical studies, interesting as anticipating
in many respects the constitutional and political history of America, but utterly
incapable of commending themselves to the conscience of contemporaries.
13. Carlyle's Cromwell, a, part 8, p. 12o seq.
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statute or ordinance to the contrary of the aforesaid liberty, shall
be esteemed as null and void." 1 '
It is certainly of the last importance to the student of con-
stitutional history to remember that it was the highly trained legal
consciousness of the seventeenth century, which had developed
in an extraordinary manner, plans and details of constitutional
limitation, to which we owe the colonial charter, an instrument so
wisely elaborated that it was not only the general conception giv-
ing it birth which was to survive, but, in two instances at least,
the very terms of these charters themselves drawn, perhaps, by
the same hands employed but a few years previously to pen the
documents of the Puritan revolution, were afterwards deemed
worthy long to subsist as the constitutional basis of independent
state governments beyond the Atlantic.
Gordon E. Sherman.
x4. Instrument of Government, § 38. The development of the conception
of the supremacy of law, through the early years of the seventeenth century,
together with the growing idea of the common law's imprescriptible title to
reverence, are sketched by Mr. J. N. Figgis in his "Divine Right of Kings"
(Cambridge University Press, 1896, p. 226 seq.).
Cromwell's use of the term, "1 Frame of Government," is paralleled in the
Pennsylvania Charter of 1682-"Frame of Government "-and the same
nomenclature reappears in the Pennsylvania State Constitution of 1776--" Plan
or Frame of Government." Here the term finds employment in a concrete
sense; with this we may contrast Clarendon's expression, "The frame and
constitution of the kingdom" (Hist. of the Rebellion, Book 4. sec. 40), where
it denotes, of course, the unwritten English Constitution or form of govern-
ment.
